QUOD SI IN CORPORIBUS SENCIENDIS. — Prosa
5
"But what yif that in bodyes to ben feled
(that is to seyn, in the takynge of
knowlechynge of
bodily thinges), and albeit so that the qualites of bodies
that ben object fro withoute-forth moeven and entalenten the
instrumentz of the wittes, and albeit so that the passioun of the
body (that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce) goth toforn the
strengthe of the wirkynge corage, the whiche passioun or
sufraunce clepith forth the dede of the thought in hymself and
moeveth and exciteth in this menewhile the formes that resten
within-forth, and yif that in sensible bodies, as I have seid,
our corage nis nat ytaught or empriented by passioun to knowe
thise thinges, but demeth and knoweth of his owne strengthe the
passioun or suffrance subject to the body — moche more than
tho
thingis that ben absolut and quit fro alle talentz or affecciouns
of bodyes (as God or his aungelis) ne folwen nat in discernynge
thinges object fro withoute-forth, but thei acomplissen and
speden the dede of hir thought. By this resoun, thanne, ther
comen many maner knowynges to dyverse and differynge substaunces.
For the wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and despoiled
of alle oothre knowynges — thilke wit cometh to beestis that
ne
mowen nat moeven hemself her and ther, as oistres and muscles and
oothir swich schelle-fyssche of the see that clyven and ben
norisschid to roches. But the ymaginacioun cometh to remuable
bestis, that semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any
thing. But resoun is al oonly to the lynage of mankynde, ryght
as intelligence is oonly the devyne nature. Of whiche it folweth
that thilke knowynge is more worth than thise oothre, syn it
knoweth by his propre nature nat oonly his subget (as who seith,
it ne knoweth nat al oonly that apertenith properly to his
knowinge) but it knoweth the subjectz of alle othre knowynges.
"But how schal it thanne be, yif that wit and
ymaginacioun
stryven ayein resonynge and seyn that, of thilke universel
thingis that resoun weneth to seen, that it nis ryght naught? For
wit and ymaginacioun seyn that that that is sensible or
ymaginable, it ne mai nat ben universel; thanne is either the
jugement of resoun soth, ne that ther nis no thing sensible; or
elles, for that resoun woot wel that many thinges ben subject to
wit and to ymaginacioun, thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn
and fals, whiche that lokith and comprehendith that that is
sensible and singuler as universel. And yif that resoun wolde
answere ayein to thise two (that is to
seyn, to wit
and to ymaginacioun), and seyn that sothly sche hirselve
(that is to seyn, resoun) lokith
and comprehendith,
by resoun of universalite, bothe that that is sensible and that
that is ymaginable; and that thilke two (that is to seyn, wit and
ymaginacioun) ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhaunsen hemself to
knowynge of universalite, for that the knowynge of hem ne mai
exceden ne surmounten the bodily figures: certes of the knowynge
of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to the more
stidfast and to the mor parfit jugement; in this manere
stryvynge, thanne, we that han strengthe of resonynge and of
ymagynynge and of wit (that is to seyn, by resoun and by
imagynacioun and by wit), we scholde rathir preise the cause of
resoun (as who seith, than the cause of
wit and of
ymaginacioun).
"Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankynde ne
weneth nat that the devyne intelligence byholdeth or knoweth
thingis to comen, but ryght as the resoun of mankynde knoweth hem.
For thou
arguist and seist thus: that if it ne seme nat to men that some
thingis han certeyn and necessarie bytydynges, thei ne mowen nat
ben wist byforn certeinly to betyden, and thanne nis ther no
prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that prescience
be in thise thingis, thanne is ther nothing that it ne bytydeth
by necessite. But certes yif we myghten han the jugement of the
devyne thoght, as we ben parsoners of
resoun, ryght
so as we han demyd that it byhovith that ymaginacioun and wit ben
bynethe resoun, ryght so wolde we demen that it were ryghtfull
thing that mannys resoun oughte to summytten itself and to ben
bynethe the devyne thought. For whiche yif that we mowen
(as who seith that, if that we mowen, I
conseile
that) we enhaunse us into the heighte of thilke soverein
intelligence; for ther schal resoun wel seen that that it ne mai
nat byholden in itself, and certes that is this: in what manere
the prescience of God seeth alle thinges certeins and
diffinyssched, althoughe thei ne han no certein issues or
bytydyngis; ne this nis noon opinioun, but it is rather the
simplicite of the soverein science, that nis nat enclosed nor
ischet withinne none boundes.
